Thursday, January 28, 2010

Beering's Letters on Bribes : Richard A. Posner's Simple Plan Must Fail

The author Francis K. Fong acknowledges the superiority of Richard A. Posner's scholarship (outside of chemistry), his proficiency in the English language to make plausible otherwise off-the-wall notions.  One topic has emerged as his favorite: how judges think, and why public corruption makes good economic sense.  On this kind of discourse, which would border on the bizarre, was based Fong's contract with Treasury to detect and punish Posner for the $250,000 he received to set in motion the simple plan.   Consider how he, a judge, thinks:
"So what is wrong with bribing public officials to obtain public services, provided the practice is known and wages are adjusted accordingly? In effect, bribes shift the financing of public services from taxes to a combination of taxes and fees for service. By injecting a market element into public services, bribes can actually improve efficiency when used to get around rigid or inefficient rules."
In support of the McClellan-Kennedy report of 1959, Steve Beering explained that Posner's economic model was not mere theory.  On 5-15-95, Beering wrote that Judge Allen Sharp ("the Bursten judge") accepted a $20,000 bribe to enter a plea for Ben Lesniak, PCDF directors' appointed head of the East Chicago Housing Authority Board of Commissioners for awarding federally funding building contracts to bidders offering the highest kickbacks.  On 5-19-95, Beering reported that Judges James T. Moody and Richard A. Posner were paid $5,000 and $250,000, respectively.  In return, Moody was to keep the Woodmar claimants from getting paid the $48,903.81; and Posner was to implement the simple plan. Moody would "grant" the dead (fictitious) claimants the $ 48,903.81, which Posner had disbursed 1978 to the NSF OIG employees, who in turn would enforce the Calvin cycle as NSF's Dark Photosynthesis Funding Standard (DPFS). Lawyers would be disbarred for challenging the court's incorrect actions; applicants for grants would be denied NSF funding for addressing Calvin'sin the Calvin-Pon paper ("Reviewer No.8"); and employees of governmental agencies would be fired for disclosing the simple plan.  In November of 2000, GAO OSI referred to TIGTA the Margerum-Posner transfer to PEFCU of the $48,903.81, as disclosed on the PX 45 tape by Steve Beering.  So Posner simply had a TIGTA insider, Robert Quigly, to certify to his superiors that the PX 45 tape transferred to Mullarkey by the court (Moody) was in its original condition and had not been abbreviated by Posner.   

Posner could have walked away with the $250,000 had the crimes of public corruption were victimless, as Posner had hoped, and everyone involved lies low and keeps silent.

But the crimes were not victimless; and the simple plan was doomed by both the perpetrators and victims alike, who broke their silence: Steve Beering's letters unraveling the bribes paid to the judges to eliminate MacLauchlan; Kelly Lee's summary of the Eisert correspondence; Doug Klitzke's responses affirming the Bauman-Margerum connections; Cordova's finding upon Purdue's (Michael Fosmire) literature search on Web in Science, by which the Margerum news release unraveled, Hunt Submissions at 100, a scheme perfected to penetrate the United States Treasury; and finally, the dots connecting PCDF's promotion of the Lawler tract to Justice Sullivan's propensity for tampering with the official records - enabling an analysis of Richard A. Posner's simple plan.   

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